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Abstract  
Contemporary research universally shows that corruption is an alarming issue, hindering 
socio-economic development across the globe. Realizing this, the international community 
fights a constant battle to prevent companies from engaging in bribery with foreign 
governments. Even so, new scandals surface each year, involving corporations from countries 
all over the world. This thesis examines the underlying motives of managers of multinational 
companies choosing to break the law in this way. Are these simply corrupt individuals, is the 
related legislation wanting, or is in fact the corrupted environment to blame? Looking at some 
of the larger public scandals of recent years, we try to identify what in the encounter between 
a global MNC and a foreign government that allows this issue to persist, despite the 
compelling proof that it should not. Analyzing these cases, we find that the search for profits 
in the less developed world often puts the manager in an impossible situation, wedged 
between moral expectations, and those of the employer. We therefore argue that companies 
need to change their policies when internationalizing to countries that are known to be 
pervasively corrupted, providing all employees with clear frameworks for the likely 
encounters with corrupt government officials. We also argue that caution should be exercised 
when allowing local adaptation of overseas business units, ensuring that the corrupted culture 
of a country does not infect the corporation. 
Keywords: Corruption, Driving Forces, MNC, Bribery, FCPA  
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1. Introduction 
 
The introductory chapter will clarify the aim of this thesis and the main research question will 
be revealed, which is “What drives MNCs to corrupt behaviour abroad?”. Furthermore, 
delimitations will be made and definitions will be given to some ambiguous terms in this field 
such as corruption and bribery.  
”A senior British civil servant was visiting a government in a West African country when he 
suddenly became puzzled by his guide‟s habit of calling out sums of money as they passed 
each official‟s office. Puzzlement turned to outrage when he discovered the amounts 
represented the going rate for bribing each official.  Accustomed to the impeccable standards 
of British civil service, the visitor exclaimed: „Good God! Are there no honest men left in this 
department?‟ His guide though on this for a moment, and then replied: „one or two, but 
they‟re very expensive.” - (Edevbaro, 1998) 
The above story has certainly been adapted for comedic effect, but it nonetheless carries a 
profound message. It is an example of what is modernly referred to as pervasive corruption; a 
phenomenon where misuse of political power for private gain has been so deeply 
institutionalized in a country that it is no longer questioned, but rather accepted and adapted 
to. The West African country that the story refers to can be one out of many, for this is a 
region where the most basic of public services are crippled by corrupt behavior. In the poorest 
nations of the world, this is a problem that is especially dangerous. But, as this paper will 
show, no part of the world is spared the hazards of corruption today. 
Though public servants are typically on the receiving end of a corrupt transaction, those that 
willingly pay them for special treatment are diverse. The MNCs of the world are becoming 
omnipresent in a global marketplace. As globalization eases the access to foreign markets for 
companies, the competition between them intensifies more and more. Different players rush 
to the developing economies, each hoping to profit on the vast amount of unsatisfied demand 
that exists there. Among the larger firms, this is often a rat race than can have very few 
winners in each case. In such a hectic time, it is perhaps no surprise that some corporations 
have taken to rather questionable means of establishing a competitive edge. 
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1.1 The aim of the thesis and the research questions  
 
The aim of this thesis is to provide a new understanding of corporate corruption when MNCs 
internationalize. When speaking of internationalizing, all new business relations with foreign 
partners will be considered as such, which can be everything from a new filial in the foreign 
country to an order agreement. We would like to identify the factors that drive MNCs to 
corrupt actions when establishing new business relations abroad, hence the main research 
question;  
 What drives MNCs to corrupt behaviour abroad?  
 
We will use existing information on public corruption to see if it can give us a deeper 
understanding of the driving forces behind corrupt activities of MNCs. Perhaps the MNCs see 
opportunity to bend the rules once being abroad, or maybe they just become victims to the 
systematic corruption in the foreign country. However the situation may be, we believe that it 
is necessary to examine external factors which can lead to the decision of acting corruptly. 
Since corruption levels vary between countries, we find it to be important to study both the 
country‟s corruption levels and situation, also the entity of the MNC – to see in which way 
they influence each other. 
The second research question is whether these corrupt activities can diminish when 
internationalizing, and if so, how? I.e.: 
 How can corporate corruption be fought when MNC‟s internationalize?  
 
The possibilities of cleaner ways of conducting business abroad will be briefly explored under 
Recommendation. Despite of the importance of this second research question, it is the prior 
research question that is the aim of this thesis. It is our opinion that this research area of why 
MNCs are corrupt when internationalizing is less developed and not updated to current 
corporate corruption scandals, e.g. theories developed by Trevino (1986) and Haney and 
Zimbardo (1973-1974). Furthermore, enable to diminish corporate corruption one must seek 
answers beyond the reaches of quick fixes; go to the bottom of this corrupt behaviour and ask 
why in the first place they arise.  
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1.2 Delimitations of the study  
 
Some theories imply that corruption can be beneficial to some governments because it oils 
bureaucracy, making public processes more pragmatic and effective (Leff, 1964).  However, 
little empiric evidence supports these theories. Theories and empirics which imply the 
contrary are overwhelming and almost all governments and international organization 
acknowledge the danger of corruption (Mauro,1995; Triesman,1998; Hellman, Jones and 
Kaufmann, 2000). Without further discussion, we declare corruption to be destructive for 
society, without exceptions. The consequences of corruption on the country and the 
corporation will be elaborated under Background. 
Despite of the importance small businesses have on the world economy, all attention will be 
given MNCs. MNCs attract greater global attention than small businesses, translating into 
frequent media flows and a great availability of information. We do not dispute the encounters 
small businesses have with corruption; corruption is with all certainty a reality for them as 
well. However, the information is so scarce that it would jeopardize the integrity of this thesis.  
Including small businesses in this thesis would produce a different conclusion as well; they do 
not react to corruption the same way as MNC‟s do, due to reasons which will be discussed 
under Background.  
When describing possible causes to governmental corruption, no consideration will be given 
to the long-term history of the country. These factors are certainly explanatory to the situation 
of the country; however, we believe it to be irrelevant for the thesis. The causes of corruption 
chosen for this thesis are of such nature, that they give opportunity for improvement and are 
receptive to change. They are also more current and directly linked to corruption levels. For 
instance, if colonialism is believed to have weakened the institutions of a country and that has 
led to a vulnerability to corruption, then the weak institutions are treated as the cause of 
corruption.  
Furthermore, the geography of our cases is not restricted to any specific region or continent. 
The origin and size of the MNC were the main criteria for the selection of cases. We 
deliberately chose corruption scandals that affected many countries in the world and involved 
large MNCs  - giving us both width and depth to the thesis.  
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1.3 Definitions  
 
Corruption is a very ambiguous term given its relativism around the world. A general 
definition will however be useful throughout the thesis and applied to various situations. Most 
organization such as the TI (2009a), UN (2004), and OECD (1997) interpret corruption as 
abuse of entrusted power for private gain. OECD (1997) finds this general definition to be 
rather useful for awareness-raising purposes and the development of anti-corruption strategies 
and policies. The international community however, including the OECD (1997) and the UN 
(2004), prefer establishing a range of corrupt offences and behaviour rather than giving a 
generic definition of corruption. The OECD considers bribing foreign public officials an 
example of an offence. The UN also includes misappropriation, embezzlement and other 
diversion of property by public officials in their conventions. The Council of Europe (1998: 
pp. 10-11) considers trading in influence as a criminal activity as well, condemning the 
offering, promising and the paying of a bribe requiring their signatories to criminalize all 
three types of conduct.  The UNCAC (2004) makes the similar statements.   
Trading in influence takes place when public officials or other people in power, trade their 
influence for money to someone seeking this influence (Council of Europe, 1998; 10-11).  
Bribery is when one party offers or promises advantages such as money for instance, in order 
to influence their decisions and acts. Active bribery is when giving or promising a bribe, and 
passive bribery is receiving one (OECD, 1997). 
Fraud is basically corrupt payments that can be conducted in endlessly many ways. It can 
manifest as everything from a bribe in the form of an overpriced payment to providing an 
inferior quality than promised to (Business Anti-corruption Portal, n.d). 
Embezzlement and misappropriation of public funds or resources is generally the transfer 
of public funds to private accounts, most commonly conducted in countries with autocracy 
where rulers systematically feed off from the wealth of the country (Business Anti-corruption 
Portal, n.d). 
MNC “ A firm that owns business operations in more than one country” (Hill, 2010; p.687)  
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2. Background  
The background is divided into three categories, each explaining corruption in a different 
matter. The first one gives an overall picture of corruption around the world, comparing 
corruption levels across nations. Three indexes are presented as relevant tools when 
conducting comparisons, tools that will be used in the analysis when studying the host 
countries of the MNC activities. The second category is an effort to explain why corruption 
varies between countries and why some countries are more affected by corruption than 
others. The last category speaks of the consequences and gives reasons to why governments 
and enterprises should fight corruption.  
2.1 Corruption around the world  
 
Cross-national comparisons of corruption are a complicated matter given the elusive and 
hidden nature of corruption. The definition, perception and penalties vary between countries 
hindering common ground for any cross-national empirical study (Treisman, 1998; 
Transparency International, 2010a). Furthermore, one cannot compare the amount of trials 
held or conduct any efficient legal comparison due to the risk of corrupted legal systems. In 
addition, measuring scandals alone fail to reflect the true level of corruption given that it 
depends on other factors such as freedom of press (Transparency International, 2010a). 
Perception however has overtime proven to be reliable estimation of corruption, which is why 
TI (2010a) conducts the CPI every year. It measures how local experts, business people and 
analysts from around the world perceive corruption in the public sector of each country. 178 
countries were included in the 2010 CPI. The surveys include questions relating to bribery of 
public officials, embezzlement and kickbacks in public funds respective public procurement. 
When surveys are accumulated and assessed, countries score on a scale from ten - very clean 
to zero - highly corrupt. The cleanest countries in 2010 were Denmark, Singapore, New 
Zealand, Finland and Sweden. The most corrupt countries in the world were Somalia, Iraq, 
Afghanistan, Sudan and Somalia (Figure 1).  
The largest cross-national survey is however the Global Corruption Barometer (Transparency 
International, 2010b), also conducted by TI. The Barometer explores the views of the general 
public, interviewing local people about their experiences and opinions of corruption in their 
country and the government‟s effort to fight it. In 2010, 91,500 people were interviewed in 86 
different countries making it the broadest edition of the barometer since 2003. The findings 
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suggested that global corruption levels had been rising during the last three years (Figure 2). 
Furthermore, one in every four people worldwide had bribed an employee in one of the nine 
public services during the last 12 months.
1
  The rate was the highest in countries such as 
Afghanistan, Liberia, Nigeria, Cambodia and Uganda; where over 50 per cent answered that 
they had indeed offered bribes. The reason most frequently given was that they wanted to 
avoid getting into trouble with the authorities (Barometer, 2010). Out of all the services, the 
police is the institution that has received the most bribes. Three out of ten people worldwide 
have paid a bribe to the police when coming in contact with them. Regarding anti-corruption 
efforts, 50 per cent of the general public consider their government‟s anti-corruption efforts to 
be ineffective while seven out of ten believe that the public can make a difference in the fight 
against corruption.  
Lastly, the BPI (Transparency International, 2008) is a unique measurement for corruption in 
the international marketplace. It too is conducted by TI. The latest BPI included 26
2
 countries 
in the survey; chosen due to their foreign direct investment inflows, import and their general 
effect on trade patterns. 2,742 senior business executives were interviewed; each country was 
represented by a minimum of 100 senior business executives, with consideration taken to their 
firms‟ location, size and industry. They were asked to give their views on the foreign firms 
they had conducted business with, in particular, the likelihood of them engaging in corruption 
when doing business in the country of the interviewee. This question would be answered with 
a five-point response scale which later on would be converted into a ten-point scale system 
that makes up the BPI; ranked on the basis of the national mean scores. The higher a country 
scores, the lower the likelihood of companies from the country to engage in bribery when 
doing business abroad. The countries that scored the highest and lowest scores were Canada, 
Belgium and the Netherlands respective Mexico, China and Russia. In the Asia Pacific 
region
3
, Latin America, Europe and the United States; China was the country perceived to be 
most likely to bribe in these regions. It was however India that was perceived to be the most 
likely to bribe in Africa and the Middle East, closely followed by South African companies. 
Out of the European companies, Italy scored the lowest in the BPI and was perceived to be 
more likely to bribe in Europe and the United States. The same data was used to rank the 
likelihood of bribing public officials in each industry sectors, although this time within the 
                                                          
1 Customs, education, judiciary, land, medical, police, registry & permit, tax authority-, and utility services (Transparency International, 
2 Argentina, Brazil, Chile, the Czech Republic, Egypt, France, Germany, Ghana, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, 
Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, the Philippines, Poland, Russia, Senegal, Singapore, South Africa, South Korea, the United Kingdom and the 
United States (Transparency International, 2008)  
3 India, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Pakistan, the Philippines, Singapore and South Korea (Transparency International, 2008).  
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industry sector and not foreign bribery. The industries that scored the highest (most corrupt) 
were the construction, real estate and property development industries (Figure 3). The senior 
business executives were asked to judge the public institutions most affected by corruption in 
their respective countries. Political parties were seen to be the most corrupt in all regions of 
the world, except for the African and Middle East region where the police scored to lowest 
(most corrupt).  
2. 2 Why is corruption higher in some countries than others?  
 
When trying to identify the roots of corruption, the answer may seem simple at first glance, 
the incentive is money and for that reason people are corrupt. However, if one were to accept 
this assumption and apply it to all known cases of corruption, dilemmas soon arise. If A and B 
work for the same company, why is A corrupt and B is not? Also, why is corruption the 
standard in country A and not in country B?  
Corruption is in fact a much complex dilemma, and for that reason it is sound to dissect this 
dilemma into layers and see it from different perspectives. On a national level, culture, 
economic and social development and legal systems are all factors that contribute to the many 
forms of corruption. We do however raise caution to the fact that corruption may vary 
between the regions of a country as well. Fleming and Zyglidopoulos (2009;  8-9) explain that 
a common corruption theory that can be applied to every cultural situation does not exist. 
Since business practices and organizational cultures vary between countries, so does the 
interpretation of corruption. What is considered to be a corrupt offence in one country may be 
considered to be normal business practice in another. This cultural relativism can create a 
dilemma when internationalizing to countries where corruption is norm, a key issue in this 
thesis. Moreover, when it comes to the cultural relativism, much confusion is created by the 
difference in the division of public and private. A big gap between public and private 
behaviour is characteristic to Western democratic societies, meaning that it is norm to 
separate work and private life and not letting these combine. The boundaries are less lucid in 
countries such as China and Greece for example, where exchanging gifts is a common part of 
conducting business. However, TI (2009b) clearly state in their Business Principles, a set of 
guidelines aimed at helping companies with dealing with a corrupt environment, that:  
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“ The enterprise should prohibit the offer or reception of gifts, hospitality or expenses 
whenever they could affect or be perceived to affect the outcome of business transactions and 
are not reasonable and bona fide. “ (Transparency International, 2009b; 4.5.1)  
Despite the relativism of corruption, some generalizations can be made. There are for instance 
many common denominators in the so-called transition countries; Eastern Europe and the 
former Soviet Union. Three factors in particular are lifted in the World Bank (2000) report, 
which are identified to create a vulnerability to corruption in these regions. These factors are; 
i) The writing of new laws, regulations and policies, ii) the redistribution of state wealth and 
property to the private sector and citizens, iii) the absence of institutions or organizations that 
could effectively oversee potential abuse of public office during transition. These factors 
result in people trying to encode advantages in the new system for their own benefit and by 
doing so distort a legible development in the country.  
Another factor that causes of corruption is the so-called „state capture‟, meaning the 
concentration of economic power. The problem with state capture is that economic power is 
often concentrated to a few key areas with bountiful assets and resources. These areas are not 
only rich in natural resources but also serve as important transport routes, making them 
strategically important to gain power and therefore a potential target for corruption. Countries 
with high state capture include Russia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan (World 
Bank, 2000).  
Corruption thrives in countries with weak institutions and where governments fail to support 
the rule of law and protect property and contractual rights. For this reason corruption is more 
widespread in transition- and less developed countries, which are becoming increasingly 
attractive to MNCs (Hellman, Jones, Kaufmann and Schankerman, 2000). Many factors 
contribute to the actual quality of bureaucracy, some of them being the pride associated with 
working for the government, and the hiring process.  According to Rauch and Evans (2000) 
corruption is likely to be higher in governments where recruitment and promotion is based on 
other factors than merit, for example nepotism. There is also believed to be a negative 
correlation between corruption and the wages of the public sector. The higher the wages of 
public officials are, the lower the corruption. Public wages have been raised in attempt of 
reducing corruption in countries such as Singapore, Argentina and Peru. However, an 
unwanted side-effect of raising wages in the public sector is that officials will expect bigger 
bribes to compensate for the risk of losing a more significant wage (Tanzi, 1998).   
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2.3  The consequences of corruption  
 
“Corruption is an insidious plague that has a wide range of corrosive effects on societies. It 
undermines democracy and the rule of law, leads to violations of human rights, distorts 
markets, erodes the quality of life and allows organized crime, terrorism and other threats to 
human security to flourish.” (UNCAC, 2004)   
It is safe to say that corruption is considered to be a malicious phenomenon by the 
international community. As earlier stated, NGOs and the majority of the governments share 
the statement that prefaces the UNCAC. It affects society in an immediate and long termed 
matter, hindering its economic and social development. It is known to weaken the institutional 
foundation of a country, fundamental for economic growth (World Bank, 2000). It is also 
concluded by Mauro (1995) via regression analyses that the level of corruption, the level of 
investment and economic growth of a country are negatively correlated to one another, 
meaning that the higher the corruption level is, the lower the investment level and the 
economic growth will be. So if a country should improve by one standard deviation (variation 
from mean) in the CPI than the investment rate and the annual growth rate of per capita GDP 
will increase by more than four percentage points respective over a half percentage point. The 
statistical analysis indicates also a negative correlation between corruption and government 
spending on education. If the country in question were to move up from six to eight standard 
deviations on the CPI, then the spending on education would increase by circa half a per cent 
of GDP. In addition, Mauro (1995) explains that another danger brought by corruption is the 
indifference it may cause when investing in a project as a government. When it comes to 
deciding between a project that is beneficial for the citizens and one that is not (the example 
of a dam and jet fighter is given), if the bribe is equally lucrative for the official, the 
consequences of the project for the citizens will not be considered.  
In addition to the economic effects of corruption, corruption is known to distort the role of the 
government and its ability to impose the needed enforcement and protection of property 
rights, contracts and inspect and regulate the fundamental institutions such as hospitals, banks 
and schools. Corruption can also reduce the legitimacy of market economy and even 
democracy, this being the case in transition countries (Tanzi, 1998). Although no country is 
immune to corruption and is affected to some extent, it is as earlier mentioned the developing 
world that suffers the most. It diverts development funds and undermines the government 
efforts to provide its citizens with the most basic service (UN, 2004; Macrae, 1982). People in 
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poverty are the most reliant on social security and the least capable of paying the extra costs 
that are needed for bribery and fraud – making them the most affected victims of corruption 
(World Bank, 2000). Strong indications suggest that the changes in income distribution in 
transition countries have partly occurred due to corruption (Tanzi, 1998).  
According to the World Bank (2000), corruption affects the entire society including the 
private sector and the actors within. When doing business in a more corrupt country, the costs 
will be much higher for enterprise than doing business in a “clean” country. In addition to the 
expensive of the bribes, additional costs arise when monitoring performances, minimizing 
risks and ensuring property rights. The Global Corruption Report states that half of the 
business executives interviewed estimated corruption to increase project costs with ten per 
cent and in some cases up to 25 per cent. In addition to the financial costs and lost business 
opportunities; the brand of the company, the morale of its staff and its external relations suffer 
as well (Transparency International, 2009a). It is also stated in the Global Corruption Report 
that small enterprises suffer from corruption to a higher extent than large enterprises. Small 
enterprises are often under great pressure from local government officials who impose costs 
for licenses and permissions that may be illegal or unnecessary. They do not have the same 
financial conditions as large enterprises do nor do they possess the same political power that 
comes with being a large enterprise (Transparency International, 2009a). MNC‟s have also 
the ability to let a team of employees deal with such bureaucrats, hindering corruption from 
interfering with the business (Tanzi, 1998).  
 
Taking a stand in the matter of corruption and intentionally condemning it, the enterprise will 
show signs of responsible citizenships; and it does not go unnoticed. Clean responsible 
management gives way for brand differentiation and marketing, which can boost company 
valuations and sales. Having an anti-corruption program in the business strategy or 
incorporating similar ethical guidelines, have showed to lower the risk of suffering from a 
corruption incident with 50 per cent (Transparency International, 2009a). Companies spend 
large sums on reforms and CSR programs on child labor and environmental issues – fighting 
corruption however remains a neglected social issue for companies. The Merck Foundation 
suggests anti-corruption efforts to be integrated with existing business models, considering it 
as strategic CSR (Hills, Fiske and Mahmud, 2009). 
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3. Theoretical framework  
 
This chapter assembles all theories that have been used in the thesis, starting with the Bad 
Apple Perspective. The Bad Apple Perspective is a theory that explains corrupt behaviour on 
an individual level and from an ethical point of view. The bad barrel perspective is of a social 
psychological nature that widens the focus and includes the organization, seeing the 
organization as a driving force behind the actions of the individual. These theories will be 
used as tools when analysing the MNC and its actions.  
The pervasiveness and arbitrariness theory categorizes the corruption in a country. We have 
included this theory in the thesis, believing it will clarify some of the challenges an MNC may 
face when internationalizing. It categorizes the national corruption in two, each requiring 
different approaches.  
The Philosophy of Ethics is an additional theory that consists of four extreme scenarios. It 
will be used as a scale that the empirical case will be compared to in the Conclusion. 
Lastly, International Law lists the most important existing international regulations and 
guidelines against corruption – they include the FCPA, the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, 
the UNCAC and Transparency International’s Business Principles.  
3.1 The bad apple perspective   
 
Fleming and Zyglidopoulos (2009, pp. 17-34) state that when corporate corruption is exposed 
in the business press and media, the fault is often directed to one or a few key perpetrators 
making them the sole culprit in the scandal. The assumption is that the organization is a 
harmonious social system made up by people who always act within the boundaries of law 
and accepted norms. When corrupt activities do take place, it is the doing of a “bad apple” 
that taints and spoils the rest of the organization – giving name to the so-called Bad Apple 
Perspective. The argument does not consider the perpetrator to be a result of the environment, 
but rather an ethical agent responsible for his or her own actions – an argument typical of 
political liberalism. The conduct of a corrupt activity is divided by Fleming and 
Zyglidopoulos, (2009; 17-34) into two stages where the following questions are relevant: 
i) Does one perceive the activity as morally incorrect? 
ii) How does one act in relation to this incorrectness?  
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How the individual answers the first question depends on his or her ethical dispositional 
make-up which can be explained by a model which consists of three stages which people 
pass through their lives. The first stage is the most primitive one – the preconventional stage. 
In this stage, people instrumentally follow ethical conduct and are obedient for the purpose of 
escaping punishment. The next stage is the conventional stage, where social norms and 
expectations are followed because people are now a part of the social guidelines and rules 
which are associated when engaging with other people. The third stage is the principled stage 
and it is characterized by people who freely choose their ethical ideals and stances even if the 
majority does not share them. It is stated that most people actually stay in the second stage.  
Trevino (1986) regards three variables when answering the second question, the first one 
being the ego strength. The concept of ego strength relates to the relation between moral 
cognition and moral action, meaning how in-line an individual‟s actions are with their 
beliefs.  An individual of high ego strength is more likely to resist impulses, follow their 
convictions and do what he or she thinks is right.   
Trevino (1986) reviews the second variable field dependence and come to the conclusion that 
executives who are field dependent rely on the convictions and ideas of others, whenever 
making decisions in difficult and ambiguous ethical situations. This however makes 
executive vulnerable to succumbing to unethical opinions as well. The last variable is the 
locus of control that is an internal and external scale that measures how individuals perceive 
the control they have over the happenings in their lives. An executive with internal locus of 
control feels that his or hers decisions actually make a difference and have the ability to can 
change outcomes, contrary to an external locus of control which gives a sense of 
powerlessness. The executives who belong to the latter category are more likely to derail 
from their cognitive moral due to the conviction that their actions do not matter and therefore 
do not need to take responsibility. 
3.2 The bad barrel perspective  
 
Fleming and Zyglidopoulos (2009; 68-84) differentiate this perspective from the prior because 
the focus of the Bad Barrel perspective is not the individual corruption but the environment 
that surrounds the individual. The assumption is that people are capable of acting both ethical 
and unethical, depending on the circumstances and the situation they are in. 
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When discussing the Bad Barrel perspective, it is not uncommon to refer to Zimbardo‟s 
famous Stanford 
experiment. The psychology 
professor initiated a role-
play where one group of 
college students was asked 
to play guards and the others 
prisoners. The environment 
turned out to have a 
tremendous effect on the 
individuals‟ behaviours;  the guards showed sadistic tendencies within a week of the 
experiment (Haney and Zimbardo, 1973-1974). This came to show how the environment 
could change the behaviour of individuals and in this case turn ordinary people to sadistic 
guards. Fleming and Zyglidopoulos (2009) identify four factors that can drive an individual to 
unethical behaviour and corruption.  
Firstly, pressure for conformity comes from the desire to be accepted and liked by others, 
making us act differently in a group than how we would act individually. We avoid going 
against the group, fearing alienation and instead we conform to the groups opinions even if 
they contradict with our own convictions. Many social psychological experiments confirm 
this theory, the most famous one being conducted by Ash (1956). Wanting to test the effect of 
peer pressure, he constructed a group of four which of three participants were directed to 
unanimously select the same incorrect answer. The experiment was to see how the forth 
participant, oblivion to the true purpose of the experiment, would answer. To Ash‟s surprise 
three of four participants chose the same wrong answer as the previous three participants 
despite the simplicity of the task. Another aspect to conformity is authority and what people 
are capable of doing when being instructed by an authoritarian figure. Milgram‟s (1963) noted 
experiment “obedience to authority” showed that the majority of the test persons obeyed 
authority (the scientists in the experiment) and went against their own ethical beliefs by 
electro shocking and hurting (so they thought) other human beings.  
Fleming and Zyglidopoulos (2009) do state that the individual is capable of creating his or her 
own explanations and stories which rationalize corrupt behaviour and are self-deceptive. 
Much is however borrowed and inspired from the environment and already existing 
explanations -the availability of rationalization. An example of this is extenuative language 
                Figure A –Fleming and Zyglidopoulos (2009, p. 71) 
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that washes off the negative associations with certain words or diminishes the severity of 
them, the example of „higher costs‟ turning to „capitalizing excess capacity‟ illustrates this.  
Ethical distance is the gap between an act and the consequence that follows. The correlation 
between them is that the more distant the consequences of a corrupt act are, the easier it gets 
for the individual to conduct them. Fleming and Zyglidopoulos (2009) divide this term into 
types; the first one being the temporal distance translating the gap into a time period and the 
further in the future the consequences appear the vaguer the unethical nature of an act will 
seem today. The second type of ethical distance is the structural distance. It is much easier to 
rationalize corruption if one breaks it down to just an action in one division of the 
organization, far away from the end-result.  
The last factor is the organizational complexity which can contribute to conformism in the 
organization. Complex companies are characterized by specialization and this translates often 
to a homogenous group of employees which makes conformity all the more intense. 
Organizational complexity in general leaves more room for denial of responsibility, structural 
distance and eventually corruption (Fleming and Zyglidopoulos, 2009).  
3.3 Pervasiveness and Arbitrariness  
 
As we have seen, corruption is an issue that is omnipresent around the world. That does not, 
however, mean that it is the same kind of corruption we see in different regions.  In order to 
deepen the understanding of the corruption faced by MNCs in host countries, Rodriguez, 
Uhlenbreck and Eden (2005) present the concept pervasiveness and arbitrariness. 
Pervasiveness refers to the likelihood of encountering, or having to deal with, corrupt officials 
in a nation. A high pervasiveness means that companies in the country should expect to 
encounter corruption, while a low pervasiveness indicates the opposite. Further, a company 
that chooses to invest in a pervasive country can gain legitimacy by complying with the 
corrupt nature. By adapting to a corrupt culture, the company is seen as less alien and has an 
advantage on non-compliant firms. As such, a company that chooses to act in ways that are 
regarded as unethical in other countries can reap benefits from operating in a country 
characterized by pervasiveness. Pointed out is also, that such a country often suffers the 
typical social maladies caused by corruption in terms of infrastructure and economic growth. 
We would therefore like to stress the fact that even though a certain company can reap 
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benefits from such an environment, its population will suffer (Rodriguez, Uhlenbreck and 
Eden, 2005). 
An example of a country where this type of corruption is prominent would be Indonesia or the 
Philippines. This means that corruption is heavily institutionalized in these countries and that 
there may be a “running rate” for bribing a certain official. Also, the institutional hierarchy is 
strong, and bribes are typically effective (Rodriguez, Uhlenbreck and Eden, 2005). 
Arbitrariness is a slightly more complex term. Rather than describing the degree of corruption 
in a region, it relates to the complexity and uncertainty of the bureaucracy in a corrupt 
country. In a country characterized by high arbitrariness, there is no telling what effect a 
certain corrupt transaction or bribe will have. To illustrate; in a country characterized by high 
pervasiveness but low arbitrariness, it will be clear how much it costs to bribe a certain 
official, and what bribes are needed to gain a specific benefit. If it were the other way around, 
there would be no guarantee that a bribe would have the desired effect at all, or that additional 
bribes would not be necessary. As such, this type of environment is common when the laws 
and regulations of a country are liberally interpreted or when the internal structure of 
institutions is not clear (Rodriguez, Uhlenbreck and Eden, 2005). 
The example of post-soviet Russia is lifted as a good illustration of an arbitrarily corrupted 
environment. When the super-state collapsed, many officials made overlapping claims of 
power all over the institutional map. The result was a corrupt state where it was not clear who 
had the power to do certain things, and who did not. Thus, a bribe to a certain official aimed 
at gaining a specific benefit would not necessarily yield results (Rodriguez, Uhlenbreck and 
Eden, 2005). 
It is argued that even though international management scholars do appreciate that there are 
different forms of corruption, they are poorly categorized as the categorization is not based on 
the nature of the corrupt transaction in question. Using the model of arbitrariness and 
pervasiveness, we can not only understand the nature of a certain corrupt environment, but 
also the motivation of a company choosing to invest in said environment. We will therefore 
apply these terms in our analysis of the cases in our empirical section, and attempt to link 
them to the actions of the companies in question as well as the outcome of the situation 
(Rodriguez, Uhlenbreck and Eden, 2005). 
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3.4 Straw Men 
 
Hill (2010; 136-138) refers to the four theories described below as straw men. This means that 
they are, by themselves, unsatisfactory in describing how companies “should” act when 
encountering unethicalness abroad. Instead, the straw men are usually presented by scholars 
as a means of providing a framework for more complex and complete theories. As such, they 
are not meant to contain solutions, but to express the complexity of the issue. Even so, they 
are not without their individual merits, and are sometimes adopted by companies in the real 
world.  
In this thesis, as it is not concerned with offering philosophical theories on ethics, the straw 
men are used in a different way. Instead of moving on to offer more complex theories, these 
rather polarized examples are applied in the analysis of the cases to see if one describes those 
companies better than the other three. In that sense, the radical nature of the straw men can be 
very favorable. 
3.4.1 Righteous Moralism 
 
A theory that is typically associated with managers from the developed world, righteous 
moralism constitutes the belief that appropriate behavior abroad is the same as appropriate 
behavior in the home country. That is, that the morals and laws of the domestic country are to 
be assumed as appropriate no matter the location (Hill, 2010). 
Immediately, two fatal flaws are identifiable with this theory. Firstly, it assumes that the 
morals of the home country are satisfactory, which is not necessarily the case. Secondly, it 
assumes that they would be culturally applicable in the host country. Clearly, this is rarely the 
case. Indeed, assuming that gift giving is as unacceptable as in most European countries might 
render one completely incapable of doing business in a country such as China, where such 
actions are expected (Hill, 2010).  
3.4.2 Naïve Immoralism 
 
This theory builds on the thought that two wrongs make a right. In essence, this means that a 
manager of an MNC that finds herself in a foreign country should look upon her environment 
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and assess the behavior of others. If she finds that they indeed violate some moral codes, then 
she should do the same. To illustrate this, the “drug lord” problem is used as a classic 
example. Say that companies in a South American country regularly pay off a local drug lord 
in exchange for being able to conduct their business in peace. Suddenly, an MNC from 
another country sets up operations in the same region. The manager is now faced with the 
choice of committing bribery and funding illegal business, or risking the drug lord‟s 
retribution, and thereby the security of her employees (Hill, 2010). 
In stark contrast to righteous moralism, this theory must instead assume that the moral code of 
the host country is satisfactory for ethicalness to be maintained. The especially noteworthy 
aspect of this naïve immoralism, however, is the dilemma that is poses. In the case of the drug 
lord example, the only way to completely avoid problems is to withdraw the venture (Hill, 
2010). 
3.4.3 Cultural Relativism 
 
Perhaps best defined by the age-old imperative “when in Rome, do as Romans do”, cultural 
relativism describes ethics as a bi-product of culture. This means that an act is deemed just or 
not based entirely on the principles of the host-country (Hill, 2010). 
At first glance, there may seem to be merit to this theory. After all, to adapt culturally to one‟s 
environment is an essential strategy for MNCs. However, as we have seen, ethical standards 
and legislation often leave much to be desired in the countries receiving the most FDI inflows 
in recent years. Further, cultural relativism can be used by companies as an excuse for corrupt 
behavior. British Petroleum is an example of a company that has rejected this strongly as a 
strategic measure. They have refused to make facilitating payments as they believe that bribes 
corrupt all involved parties. Another strong criticism against this view is that if one simply 
accepts low ethical standards as culture to adapt to, solving the severe socio-economic 
problems that corruption causes becomes impossible (Hill, 2010).  
3.4.4. The Friedman Doctrine 
 
Even though this doctrine does not specifically concern business ethics, it is included because 
of the strong link between ethical behavior and CSR policies.  
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Milton Friedman gained wide renown in the seventies for his economic scholarship. In 
contrast to modern CSR scholars such as Archie Carroll, Friedman argued that the only 
binding responsibility a company has is to act within the law. As long as no legislation is 
violated, the only responsibility of the company is to maximize its profits in any way possible, 
according to Friedman. The reason for this was that the company exists to satisfy the needs of 
its owners, the stockholders. The manager of a firm should therefore only be concerned with 
earning them money that they can then spend as they see fit. It is however not up to the 
manager to make a decision regarding social investments. 
As this paper has shown, companies can be seen as having a responsibility to be economically 
responsible, but their relationship with society is not quite so simple. For one thing, it is now 
more than ever important for companies to be perceived as responsible in order to maintain 
profitability as well. Even so, the cold logic of the Friedman Doctrine can perhaps be used to 
explain the mentality behind many modern companies‟ behavior (Hill, 2010). 
3.5 International Law 
 
Though legislation regarding the corrupt practices of corporations varies in quality and clarity 
across the world, there is no mistaking that partaking in corrupt transactions is almost 
universally seen as illegal. When attempting to describe the dangers of corrupt activity, it is 
therefore important to realize that the most alarming of these is likely to be legal prosecution. 
Even though each sovereign state has their own legislation on the subject, the globalized 
world has seen a rising need of international frameworks for when corruption is perpetrated in 
several countries at once, or across borders. In this paper, we have selected what we believe to 
be four major frameworks that are commonly used in such cases.  
3.5.1 The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act  
 
Passed in 1977, the FCPA is a national American law written to improve on the image of the 
American business system after a major investigation revealed that US companies were 
commonly making “facilitating payments” to foreign officials and political parties around the 
world. Even though this is not a law that can be applied to incidents completely isolated from 
the US, companies with partial activity in America have faced universal prosecution as a 
result of violation of this law. One such example is the investigation into German automaker 
Daimler AG, discussed later in this paper (US Department of Justice, n.d.). 
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The general purpose of the FCPA is to make it unlawful for certain American people to be 
willingly involved in corrupt payments. This includes not only making such payments, but 
also offering to make, promising to make and authorizing the making of them.  A corrupt 
payment is defined as any transaction made to attain or retain business or establishing unfair 
advantages over competitors. This also includes any payment made to impact a foreign 
official in their official capacity, making them abandon their lawful duty or act in violation 
their responsibilities (US Department of Justice, n.d.). 
As we see in a few of the cases presented in this paper, the FCPA is not used only to 
prosecute American companies acting abroad. Their jurisdiction has in fact grown with time; 
as of today, the FCPA applies to all companies that further a corrupt process with any action 
within the United States. This means that any form of presence, whether the enterprise has a 
subsidiary or filial in the US, will create jurisdiction.  It also applies to all companies that 
have securities listed in the country. This is what has led to US courts prosecuting and fining 
non-American companies. It also means that any country can use its own legislation to pursue 
legal action against the same company (US Department of Justice, n.d.). 
After the passing of the FCPA, American international business changed dramatically. Many 
firms were prosecuted and managers sent to jail. In the wake of this, congress became 
concerned that they were hampering the progress of American companies abroad compared to 
those that did not have to concern themselves with anti-corruption legislation. Therefore, the 
American parliament has since allowed tax deduction for so called “speed-money”. This is 
especially noteworthy, since the payments allowed by the FCPA are those related to essential 
governmental functions abroad. Examples include receiving permits, licenses, receiving 
police protection and using the national mail service. In this paper, we have discussed the 
phenomenon of pervasive corruption and its toxic effects on the economy of some countries. 
This exception to the FCPA seems to permit the very pervasively corrupt transactions, further 
asserting the sense of hopelessness prominent in these regions (US Department of Justice, 
n.d.). 
3.5.2 The OECD Anti-Bribery Convention 
 
After the passing of the FCPA in the United States, the executive branch began negotiations 
with the OECD to encourage their major trade partners to pass legislation similar to their own 
(US Department of Justice, n.d.). Nine years after the negotiations began; the organization 
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presented OECD (1997) Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Officials in 
International Business. It was soon signed by all OECD member states, as well as a small 
selection of countries from outside. The aim of the convention was that all signing countries 
would pursue an effective legislation against any bribery-related crime committed within their 
jurisdiction. 
The nations were called upon to not only criminalize the bribing or authorization of bribing of 
any government employee abroad, but also to implement a wide jurisdiction and certain 
sanctions against offenders (OECD, 1997). 
As a support unit to the signing states, the OECD (1997) founded a working group on bribery, 
which provides resources in implementing the convention properly. Their work with 
governments is split into three phases. Phase one consists of evaluation of a country‟s 
legislation and how well it fulfills the goals of the convention. Phase two evaluates the 
implementation of before mentioned legislation, ensuring that implementation is both 
theoretical and practical. Phase three, active since 2010, is directly involved with enforcing 
the convention and all related recommendations. This process of evaluation has met positive 
criticism in the international community, being dubbed the “gold standard” by Transparency 
International, the world‟s leading NGO on corruption.  
Since the convention was written, it has been amended with recommendations, the most 
recent in 2009. These recommendations emphasize the importance of international 
cooperation on combating bribery, and also of protecting the so called whistle blowers of the 
private sector. Another noteworthy amendment is that tax deduction for speed-money is no 
longer tolerated by the OECD (1997).  
Failure by a member state to comply sufficiently with the convention is met with the criticism 
of the work group, which will publicly send a mission to the government in question. 
In conclusion, the OECD (1997) Convention on Anti-Bribery has spread the principles of the 
FCPA to most of the industrialized countries of the world, leveling the playing field for 
MNCs from the member states.  
3.5.3 The UNCAC 
 
The United Nations, always a major player in monitoring international ethical behavior, have 
also adopted their own convention on bribery-related crime. In December of 2000, it was 
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decided in the General Assembly that in addition to the convention on transnational organized 
crime, a convention specifically targeting this type of crime was necessary – UNCAC (2004).  
Signed and adopted in Mexico in 2002, the convention criminalizes a wide range of offences 
that can be seen as corruption-related. This includes bribery, but also money laundering and 
any kind of obstruction of justice related to bribery. Uniquely to the UNCAC (2004) is that it 
that it can be used to prosecute crime directly rather than just encouraging national legislation 
on the subject. Even so, the stated goal is to exist as a preventive measure. Hence, this 
convention, too, focuses heavily on advising governments in constructing their institutional 
mechanisms for crime prevention. This includes ethical policy models, legislation models, 
and disciplinary measures seen as appropriate  
Another unique aspect to this particular convention is that is it reached agreements on asset 
recovery. This means that if, for example, a certain official were to embezzle public funds, the 
convention can be called upon to demand the funds be returned to the appropriate 
government. This is especially important in those regions of the world were resources are 
scarce and public functions fail. Coincidentally, these regions are typically crippled by 
pervasive corruption. (UNCAC, 2004)  
3.5.4 Transparency International‟s Business Principles 
 
Though not legislation per se, the business principles presented by transparency international 
are included because they provide a framework for companies to benchmark their own anti-
bribery activities. 
The Business Principles (Transparency International,  2009b) can be viewed as guidelines for 
constructing programs within the company to counter corruption. As we will see later in the 
empirical cases section, many companies have clear stands on bribery, but fail to implement 
them effectively. The principles have then been amended several times to adapt to the 
changing global environment, and the harsher legal prosecution of bribery. 
In essence, the principles themselves are fairly simple. They are only twofold, and formulated 
as follows: 
 The enterprise shall prohibit bribery in any form whether direct or indirect. 
 The enterprise shall commit to implementing a program to counter bribery. 
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While the first of the principles basically explains what the goal is, it is the second that is 
elaborated on. TI has constructed an extensive toolkit to manage the implementation of anti-
bribery policies.  
To manage a successful implementation of no-bribery policies within a company, TI suggests 
their six step program, which has the following parts: 
 Deciding on a Policy 
 Planning the Implementation 
 Develop Program Content 
 Actual Implementation 
 Monitoring the Effects 
 Evaluating the Program 
The suggested contents of such a program are elaborate. It is suggested that not only should 
principles formulated, but an extensive legal risk analysis should also be included. A company 
should also analyze the risk of it encountering bribery in its ventures, something that becomes 
especially important when internationalizing to a country that is known to be corrupt. Finally, 
the program should also contain a crisis management plan for when bribery surfaces, to 
mitigate the damage for the company and managing the reputational risk of being portrayed 
negatively in the media 
4. Methodology 
 
This section of the thesis will describe the measures taken to answer the research questions. 
That includes a description of how data was gathered and analyzed. It also includes a review 
of the source material used, and justification for the choices made when writing the thesis, 
such as what theories are used and which cases were chosen for the empirical data. The aim 
is to present a graspable description of how the work on the thesis was conducted and how it 
was motivated. 
4.1 Justification of Theories 
 
To answer the main questions of this thesis, it was apparent that a more substantial 
understanding of the global issue of corruption was necessary. The thesis therefore has a 
 23 
substantial theoretical framework. The thesis assumes that when this rather heavy base is 
established, an analysis can be conducted. 
The first theory explored is the Bad Apple and Bad Barrel perspectives. This choice is 
justified, as the thesis aims to answer the motivations behind corrupt behavior. These rather 
psychologically oriented perspectives can help describe human factor behind, which was 
hypothesized to be essential. The Bad Apple perspective however, requires extensive 
interviews which manage to reach a certain level of openness and sincerity. Analyzing a 
person‟s actions and ethical make-up, solely through this perspective could be a challenge, if 
information is scarce. This Bad Apple perspective was used in the case of Siemens, given the 
media attention of and the in-depth interviews with Reinhard Siekaczek. The Bad Apple 
perspective was not used as generously in the remaining cases.  
Next, the thesis explores the theory of the arbitrariness and pervasiveness of corruption. This 
contemporary view on corruption was chosen as it exemplifies the varied nature of corruption. 
It was believed to be important to show that corruption is by no means homogenous because it 
is omnipresent. This also enabled the thesis to examine the nature of the corruption in the 
specific nations in the mini-cases. 
When investigating theories on business ethics it was decided to include four straw men as 
described by Hill (2009; 136-138). This was because their blunt simplification serves to 
portray the difficulty a manager may face in a corrupt nation. Although none of the straw men 
are designed to present a complete perspective on ethicalness, it would be valuable if one of 
them could be more strongly attributed to the cases than others. 
Finally, much space is given in the thesis to describe the international laws and regulations 
regarding corruption. Although these are not used extensively in the analysis of the cases, 
they are necessary in order to fully grasp the issues at hand and to understand how the 
companies in the cases were persecuted. As this thesis also aims to offer recommendations for 
managers of companies combating corruption, it is important that the global efforts of 
preventing corruption are understood. This is why they are included even though they do not 
see real implication in the analysis. 
4.2 Gathering of Empirical Data 
This thesis relies mainly on secondary data. Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill (2009) describe 
the three types of secondary data that can be used in business research. Out of these, this 
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thesis relies almost exclusively on multiple resources and surveys for its theoretical 
framework, as it is constructed from books, governmental publications and organizational 
websites. Governmental information was necessary to gather information on legislation, and 
secondary surveys comprised the corruption indexes applied to the cases in the analysis. 
The cases themselves however were built entirely on documentaries, i.e. data collected from 
the media such as newspapers and TV. When investigating the complex matter of corporate 
corruption, a chronic problem exists in procuring “reliable” data. Since no corrupt entity is 
likely to admit to being so, conducting a survey to answer the research questions was not an 
option, as the survey would have to be posed to potentially corrupted respondents. It was 
therefore decided that qualitative information would be necessary. This means that at the loss 
of narrowing down the scope of the thesis, it instead tries to analyze the issues in-depth 
(Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, 2009). 
To accomplish this, extensive research was done into the largest public corruption scandals of 
recent years. Information was taken from reputable, journalistic media such as newspapers 
because it contains the only readily available source of objective research on the scandals. The 
cases that presented the most diversified and interesting perspectives on the issue were then 
chosen and consolidated into mini-cases, each put to a separate case analysis. Ultimately, 
eight cases remained that all contained some unique aspects. 
4.3 Case Analysis Method 
Based on the theoretical framework established, the eight cases were analyzed with the same 
model. The questions that were applied to every case were the following: 
 In what country were the crimes committed? 
o What factors in local, national situation contributed in this case? 
 Is the country pervasively/arbitrarily corrupted? 
 What do the statistical indexes indicate about the country? 
 Which was the host country of the MNC? 
o What factors in the company‟s/domestic country‟s situation contributed in this 
case? 
  What was the key motivation of the company? 
 What were the consequences for the company? 
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The knowledge gathered from each separate analysis were then consolidated into one 
concluding analysis were the findings were presented. It was based on this analysis that the 
thesis could then conclude with recommendations on solutions to combating unwanted 
corporate corruption. 
4.4 Literature Review 
 
The source material used to construct this thesis has all been subject to scrutiny to maintain 
the credibility of its findings. The two primary forms of material were written publications 
and internet websites. What follows if a brief justification of the sources chosen. 
4.4.1 Written Publications 
 
All written materials used to build the thesis are scientific in origin and written by researchers 
into the subject. Most of these are thesis‟ themselves, but written on a higher academic level 
than that of this one. It is therefore our belief that they have an inherent credibility; they 
would simply not serve their own purpose otherwise. This thesis has however not put the 
sources of the written publications, in turn, under scrutiny. 
The remaining written publications are educational books published on the subject of 
international business or business ethics, several of which are used by our own institution. 
These are therefore assumed to be credible. Even so, all facts taken from any publication are 
cross-referenced with a secondary source. 
4.4.2 Internet Websites 
 
As noted earlier, this thesis relies heavily on the credible nature of investigative journalism. 
The primary data is exclusively taken from articles published online. To ensure credibility in 
these, only major and reputable bureaus were chosen. These include, but are not limited to; 
Reuters, The Guardian, BusinessWeek and Bloomberg. All journalistic sources have, too, 
been cross-referenced with at least one secondary source. 
Another kind of website commonly used were those of major NGOs such as the UN and 
Transparency International, as well as some governmental ones, such as the US Department 
of Justice. The former are all reputable for their objectivity and legitimacy. The latter were 
only used for legislative text and not information used in any analysis. 
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Finally, company websites were occasionally used. As the most questionable source used, the 
application of the information found on these sites have been the most limited. They were 
mainly used to gather company accounts, such as the specific CSR policy of a corporation, 
Merck specifically.  
5. Empirical framework  
 
The empirical framework consists of eight cases, each elaborating on a scandal where an 
MNC has been corrupt abroad. Firstly, the happening is described: the crime, the motive 
behind the crime and the consequences. Secondly, an analysis is conducted on the case, 
taking relevant theories and background into consideration. Lastly, a cross-case analysis will 
be provided, concluding all case analysis.  
 
5.1 Kellog Brown & Root 
 
Halliburton Watch (n.d.) states that in 1998, one of the world‟s major contractors of major 
construction projects M.W. Kellogg, was acquired by Halliburton, an American oil giant. The 
new entity, renamed Kellogg Brown & Root (KBR), was initially highly successful. One of 
their projects involved building natural gas plants in Nigeria for the local government. In 
2004, these associated contracts had already generated some $8 billion. Even so, Halliburton 
abruptly put KBR up for sale in 2005. The reason was not to reap profit, but rather that 
Halliburton no longer wanted to be associated with KBR. This was due to a series of scandals 
and accusations of corrupt behavior suffered by KBR. Not only had they allegedly been 
embezzling funds from the pentagon itself, but a major bribery scandal regarding the Nigerian 
gas plants had surfaced. 
The Nigerian scandal had actually started long before the acquisition of M.W. Kellogg, in 
1994. At the time, the company was competing with another company over a contract for 
construction of two new gas plants. M.W. Kellogg offered the lower of the two bids, and deep 
negotiations on the construction ensued. Before any consensus was reached, a conflict erupted 
within the Nigerian government, and the minister responsible for the gas plant deal was 
replaced by the far less hospitable Dan Etete. Analysts have since claimed that Etete was a 
very corrupt individual who soon used his influence over the Nigerian energy sector for 
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personal gain. Not surprisingly, M.W. Kellogg was nervous that the deal would not go 
through, and this is where their actions start to become shrouded in obscurity (Halliburton 
Watch, n.d.). 
M.W. Kellog hired a British lawyer by the name of Jeffrey Tesler. His job was to maintain 
good relations with Nigerian officials and make sure that the deals regarding the gas plant 
construction went through. Since Tesler had very good relations with the Nigerian 
government, hiring him was in itself not strange. His substantial salary, $60 million annually, 
on the other hand, raised a few eyebrows (Halliburton Watch, n.d.). 
During the subsequent internal investigations by Halliburton, notes surfaced that suggested 
that $40 million out of Tesler‟s salary was actually meant for the Nigerian president. 
Whenever KBR needed to secure a contract in Nigeria during the following years, Tesler was 
rehired. Between the years 1994 and 2004, he was paid a total $132.3 for his services, and 
every contract negotiation he was involved in was won by KBR. His involvement might not 
have surfaced at all, had it not been for another public scandal that occurred in France 
(Halliburton Watch, n.d.). 
Georges Krammer, an employee of Technip, one of the major stakeholder companies of KBR, 
was accused of embezzlement. When the company chose not to back up his plea of innocence, 
Krammer, an employee since 35 years, extracted this vengeance by making public Tesler‟s 
role in landing the Nigerian contracts (Halliburton Watch, n.d.). 
Since Halliburton was already under heavy scrutiny after their involvement in the Iraqi war 
and U.S. vice president Dick Cheney, it did not take long before the scandal became very 
public. Since then, the company has been the subject of investigation in several countries, and 
has confessed to some of the allegations against them. As of 2011, the full scope of the 
corruption is not known, and no convictions have yet been carried out. Certain is, however, 
that Halliburton (n.d.) have been banned from ever making a bid on a Nigerian construction 
contract ever again.  
 Analysis of Kellog Brown & Root 
 
Nigeria is easily one of the worst cases of a corrupt nation in the world. The statistical indexes 
put together by TI, show that over 56% of the population willingly state that they have at 
some point engaged in bribery. This figure varies slightly between the countries in West 
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Africa, but it is clear that according to this statistic, the region is the most corrupt in the world. 
One should keep in mind that since such a portion of the Nigerian population state in an open 
survey that they have solicited or paid bribes, it indicates a level of cultural acclimatization to 
the issue. As we have seen, the most common reason to engage in bribery in the region is not 
for personal gain, but rather to avoid confrontation with authorities. This is the case in 
countries where the general population rather than only corporate managers or government 
officials engage in bribery. 
TI‟s perception index give Nigeria a score of 2,4 out of 10, meaning the perception of 
Nigeria‟s transparency in the global community is exceptionally low. We can thereby 
conclude that managers of MNCs know that Nigeria is a corrupt country, and choose to do 
business there anyway, as in many of the cases in this thesis. This is relatable to the concept 
of pervasive corruption; managers are more likely to engage in corruption when they know it 
will work. Noteworthy is that any large company that launches a venture in Nigeria should 
realize that they sooner or later will encounter its corrupt culture. If they have no clear stands 
on business ethics that they implement successfully, and no plan of action for dealing with 
corruption, it is perhaps naïve to think that controversial situations will not arise eventually. It 
is likely that if it is not made very clear to employees exactly how they should act when 
encountering a corrupt official, crimes will be committed no matter the intentions of the 
company. 
There is also an example of arbitrariness in this case: the volatility of a corrupt government. 
Even though a government can be pervasively corrupted to the point that offices have going 
rates, there is an uncertainty regarding the stability of those offices. When, as in this case, a 
minister overseeing a business venture is suddenly replaced, the rules of the game can change 
completely. In, say, a northern European government, the replacing of an official should not 
affect a business deal since the person is a representative of a government first, and an 
individual second. The European official is also bound by strict moral principles. It goes to 
show that even though there can be such a thing as pervasive corruption, there is no real 
certainty when doing business in corrupt environments. 
5.2. Siemens  
As the New York Times (2008) conclude, German electronics company Siemens agreed to 
pay a $1.6 billion fine for bribery in the United States and Germany, also an additional $1 
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billion fine was paid for internal investigations and reforms; making this the most expensive 
penalty for bribery in modern corporate history.  
The former midlevel executive Reinhard Siekaczek says in an interview with the New York 
Post that between 2002 and 2006, he used to oversee an annual bribery budget of about $40-
50 million at Siemens. Since 1999, the accumulated value of all the bribes paid by Siemens 
globally was an estimated $1.4 billion. In Nigeria for example, Mr. Siekaczek‟s unit had paid 
$12.7 million to government officials to win a government telecommunications contract. For 
a similar purpose, $5 million had been paid in bribes to the son of the Bangladeshi prime 
minister enable to win a mobile phone contract. Siemens has also paid $40 million in bribes to 
win a $I billion contract in Argentina and $14 million to government officials in China in 
order to win a contract to supply medical equipment. Other cases which have been revealed 
include Iraq, Venezuela and Israel where similar bribes worth millions of dollars have been 
paid by Siemens (The New York Times, 2008). 
Mr. Siekaczek explains to the New York Times (2008) that his team was well aware of the 
illegal nature of their actions but felt that it had to be done, otherwise Siemens would lose 
contracts and jobs would be jeopardized. The payments that were made were considered by 
the team to be crucial to keep their international competitive advantage and basically keeping 
the business unit afloat. Mr. Siekaczek had expected the top management‟s support once the 
scandal hit the press, instead he explains, they tried to make him the scapegoat since his 
signature was on all the receipts. Mr. Siekaczek responded that the public would see through 
the smokescreen and realize that no person could be solely responsible for an operation of this 
scale. He also makes the following predicament of the general reaction; “People will only say 
about Siemens that they were unlucky and that they broke the 11th Commandment - „Don‟t 
get caught.‟  
The spokesman for the association of federal criminal investigators in Germany Uwe Dolat 
draws attention to the country‟s long history of corruption. Bribing government officials was 
legal in Germany until 1999 and it was normality when conducting business. Bribery was 
Siemens‟ business model he says, so bribery was embedded in Siemens‟s culture long before 
Mr. Siekaczek. Mr. Siekaczek was sentenced to two years of probation in Germany and 
received a $150,000 fine (The New York Times, 2008).  
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Analysis of Siemens  
 
The Siemens scandal had an obvious culprit, the midlevel executive Reinhard Siekaczek. 
According to his interview with the New York Post, the board made him the scapegoat due to 
his signatures on numerous receipts – conveniently connecting him directly to the corrupt 
activities. This is a classic case of the Bad Apple perspective where one person is considered 
to be the wrongdoer and responsible for the disgrace brought upon the company. Siekaczek 
did indeed perceive his actions to be legally incorrect, however not entirely morally incorrect. 
He did not seem to be remorseful during his interview, especially when referring to the 11
th
 
Commandment. It is difficult to determine his ethical disposition and even more difficult to 
change it - somewhat of a limitation for the bad apple perspective. Siekaczek justified his 
actions by saying that he did not want to jeopardize jobs and that the bribes were to vital to 
his business unit‟s existence. This could be a possible sign of field dependency – acting as an 
advocate for his employees and letting himself be influenced by his surroundings.   
 
According to the Bad Barrel perspective however, the environment and culture of Siemens is 
to blame for Siekaczek‟s behavior. Bribing foreign officials was a part of the corporate culture 
in Germany and for Siemens it formed its business model. It is likely that the culture lingered 
on after that bribery was illegalized in Germany, still perceived to be acceptable by the 
organization. If the general view of bribery was positive, than conformity to this culture and 
general behavior is much likely to be a motive behind corrupt behavior. 
 
An additional driving force behind the corrupt acts could have been pressure possibly from 
stakeholders and other executives which led to enhancing results via illegal payments. Actual 
orders to conduct these acts could have also directly come from executives in higher 
positions, making it difficult for Siekaczek to protest.  
 
5.3 Daimler AG  
 
At this point we would like to present one of the largest investigated cases of corporate 
corruption in modern history. The Germany based car manufacturer Daimler AG is a giant 
company that produces trucks and cars for Mercedes-Benz among many others. The case of 
their corrupt past caught wide attention in the media in early 2010, when the US department 
of justice, which had been conducting their investigation into Daimler AG for over 5 years, 
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made public their findings. As in many cases, the ordeal had started with a disgruntled 
associate “blowing the whistle” on the company.(Clark, 2010)  
In 2004, an auditor of Mercedes-Benz named David Bazetta was abruptly fired after 
questioning the nature of a series of bank accounts managed by the company, all of which 
were located in South America. Angered, Bazetta accused Daimler AG of corruption, 
referring to several past occasions when executives had hinted that they kept bank accounts 
meant specifically for funneling money to foreign government employees. He filed a suit of 
wrongful dismissal against the company. In a desperate attempt to silence Bazetta, Daimler 
offered a settlement regarding his termination. Even though the accountant received a 
substantial severance package in exchange for his silence, the gears had already been set in 
motion, and the US government opened their investigation shortly after (The Guardian, 
2010a).  
Though many have conducted their own research into the corruption of Daimler AG, most 
reports agree that the corrupt transactions were made between the years 1998 and 2008. This 
was also the conclusion reached by the US department of justice. The scale of the affair was 
unprecedented, with confirmed cases of corrupt transactions in over 22 countries, many of 
which were among the most corrupt in the world (e.g. Vietnam, Indonesia, China, Russia and 
Nigeria). It was also discovered that the company had bribed officials in some of the most 
controversial governments on Earth, including Iraq (at the time under the reign of Saddam 
Hussein) and North Korea. A high-ranking official of totalitarian Turkmenistan was even 
given a custom made, heavily armored Mercedes-Benz car as a birthday gift along with help 
to translate his propaganda into German  (The Guardian, 2010a).  
In most cases, the investigation showed, the money was being used to secure contracts all 
over the world. This was often done through the usage of hollow scale companies based in the 
US. It should be noted that even though the US department of justice ended up pursuing the 
matter the furthest, Daimler AG had broken not only the laws of the US but also the 
conventions of the UN. By kicking back money to officials in Iraq, they were in violation of 
the UN Oil for Food Program, a mechanism put into place to force the Iraqi government to 
provide food and medical care for their people in exchange for access to the global oil 
market(The Guardian, 2010a).  
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It has also been speculated that Daimler AG has been in violation of German law. Even so, 
the German government has yet to pursue the matter legally. According to some, this is 
because the German standpoint on corruption is questionable. Even though the country signed 
the UNCAC in 2003, parliament has not ratified the agreement. It is worth noting that 
ratification would mean that the members of that same parliament would be prevented from 
accepting bribes. (Deutsche Welle, 2010)  
One employee of Daimler AG goes further in criticizing the German government. Christoph 
Stuermer worked for the company at the turn of the century. He was often involved in dealing 
with foreign officials, especially across Asia. Stuermer argues that in such a country, doing 
business is impossible without the favor of the individuals in charge. Even so, the domestic 
government offers no diplomatic support in the matter. Perhaps this can be seen as an 
explanation to why that favor had to be gained by other means. (Deutsche Welle, 2010)  
Since the US department of justice filed their report in 2010, Daimler AG has agreed to pay a 
total of $185 million dollars in fines and fees to quell the investigation. American FBI agents 
are currently assigned to monitoring the actions of Daimler AG over a two year trial period, 
making sure they do not fall back into bad habits (U.S Securities and Exchange Commission, 
2010). 
Analysis of Daimler AG 
 
Firstly, the scope of this particular case is so wide that no in-depth analysis can be offered on 
the countries it concerns. Noteworthy is however, that some of governments which Daimler 
AG chose to bribe were clearly controversial. Turkmenistan for instance, is one of the most 
corrupted countries in existence, scoring an abysmal 1,6 on the CPI. There is no question that 
Daimler AG knew that they were dealing with a totalitarian dictatorship, and that helping to 
translate the propaganda of its government is clearly not ethically defendable. Corruption 
seems to have been widespread and accepted throughout the Daimler AG corporation. 
Perhaps the explanation for this can be found in the host country, Germany. 
As the Siemens case explains, bribery was legal in Germany until recently. Even though this 
is no longer so, the previous legality will no doubt have affected the corporate culture of 
Daimler (note that the alleged bribes started a year before the law against bribery was passed). 
Further, there still seems to be some controversy as to where the German parliament really 
stands on corruption. These factors can easily have contributed to German companies having 
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a higher tolerance for bribery. It seems clear that internally, Daimler is best seen from a bad 
barrel perspective, as no select few individuals were the instigators in this case. Bribery was 
rather a corporate strategy. 
It is also interesting that the former employee points to the cleft between the western view on 
personal relationships business and that of eastern or less developed countries. This is 
definitely an issue that can cause much confusion for multinational actors. Even so, Daimler 
learned the hard way that the international community will no longer stand for corrupt 
behavior, no matter the explanation. 
The notion of the domestic government offering diplomatic support for its overseas 
companies also interesting. It is true that without this support, a company must act as its own 
ambassador, hence increasing the pressure to win the liking of local, individual officials.  
5.4 Johnson & Johnson 
The allegations towards the American pharmaceutical company Johnson & Johnson include 
according to Reuters (2011), bribes and sham contracts which have been paid to government 
officials and doctors in Poland, Romania, Iraq and Greece. The allegations started in 1998, 
but it is not until recently, April 8
th 
2011 that Johnson & Johnson were charged for their 
actions. The company will pay $78 million in total to the American Justice Department, the 
Securities and Exchange Commission‟s and also the United Kingdom Serious Fraud Office 
for corruption conducted by Johnson & Johnson‟s subsidiary DePuy. The penalty would have 
been more severe if the company had not cooperated with the US authorities and turned 
themselves in.  
Johnson & Johnson were accused of bribing hospitals in Poland in order to win contracts and 
public doctors in Greece and Romania to make them favor their products when proscribing – 
helping the company to earn millions in profit. Moreover, Johnson & Johnson came forward 
with the information that they had to pay a 10 percent fee in Iraq if they wanted to do business 
with the Saddam regime and win 19 contracts (Reuters, 2011). 
When the news hit the public, the Johnson & Johnson shares took a turn and went down with 
4 percent to $59.44 on the New York Stock Exchange. It is possible that the recalls of some of 
the company‟s products contributed to the downfall of share price as well. Today (April 20th 
18.35) the share price of the Johnson & Johnson is $64.39 (Reuters, 2011). 
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Analysis of Johnson & Johnson  
The majority of the countries bribed by Johnson & Johnson are in fact European, 
differentiating this case from the rest. The effected countries were Poland, Romania and 
Greece – all with CPI score lower than US‟s 7.1 and also the average European score.  
Although Greece is not usually considered to be a transition country, it did indeed go through 
a democratizing transition in 1974 – 15 years earlier than the democratization wave in Europe 
(Kassimeris, 2005). As earlier mentioned, the transition from a socialist state to market 
economy makes these countries vulnerable to corruption and often results to higher corruption 
levels. Romania for instance, has a CPI score 3.7 – lowest of the three European countries. 
The private sector in Romania has been considered to be most corrupt due to exacerbated 
bureaucracy, technological shortcomings and political intrusions in the private sector (Global 
Corruption Report, 2009). However, public corruption is considered to have slightly 
diminished due to effective governmental efforts in relation to the EU-membership in 2007.  
We would classify the corruption is these countries as arbitrary. Corruption is indeed an issue 
in these transition countries, although not in the same systematic way as one would find in a 
pervasive environment. Uncertainty may have arisen from the early stages of the transitional 
period, from the rewriting of laws and policies for instance, typicality for arbitrary corruption.  
Taking the nature of corruption in Greece, Poland and Romania and the actions of Johnson & 
Johnson into consideration – one cannot easily justify the company‟s motives. Johnson & 
Johnson bribed for making their products favoured by doctors, enable to earn extra profit and 
not because a requirement the doctors in question.  
The case of Iraq however, would suggest that corruption was pervasive. The CPI score of Iraq 
is the second lowest in the world, at 1.5. Johnson & Johnson claim that giving in to corruption 
was a necessity for doing business in Iraq, the question is however, if doing business with a 
country under military dictatorship is ethical and how the general public, the customers would 
perceive this. 
5.5 BAE Systems  
 
The British based defense, security and aerospace company BAE Systems has been under the 
scrutiny of the press since the mid 80‟s – since the company signed the al-Yamamah deal that 
was a large arms agreement with Saudi Arabia. The agreement aloud BAE to sell expensive 
 35 
military hardware to Saudi Arabia; BAE sold over 132 planes in the first tranche alone. The 
agreement would generate £43bn of revenue and keep the company alive for more than 20 
years. Given the importance of the deal, BAE bribed Saudi officials to ensure continuity of 
the deal and keep the counterpart content. Whistle blowers revealed how huge sums were 
being transferred and substantial treats were being given to and favours were done for Saudi 
officials. Secret payments were being made though a global system of offshore anonymous 
companies and undeclared subsidiaries of BAE.  „Red Diamond‟ was such a subsidiary for 
laundry and „Poseidon‟ was a unit that was created specifically for Saudi payments. Certain 
advisors of BAE were put in charge of concealing the payments to Saudi Arabia and 
disguising their origins (Guardian, 2010b).  
In 2004, still denying any allegations of corruption, the SFO uncovered evidence of indirect 
transfers from BAE to the Saudi royal family via Swiss bank accounts. The investigation was 
however stopped as a response to the Saudi threat of not cooperating with the British 
government and stop supplying intelligence about al-Qaida terrorists. Prime Minister Tony 
had personally written a letter demanding that the investigation would stop. Furthermore, in 
2007 it was revealed that BAE had paid £1bn to Saudi prince Bandar and gifted him a 
commercial aeroplane (Guardian, 2010b). 
On the 5
th
 of February 2010, BAE admitted after more than 20 years that the al-Yamamah 
deal was not entirely clean. The company pleaded guilty to the charges of false accounting 
and making misleading statements, but not bribery – for this reason, BAE is not 
internationally blacklisted from future contracts. The simultaneous negotiations with the SFO 
and the department of justice in Washington resulted in a £300 million penalty fee which was 
agreed to be paid by BAE and an additional £257 million penalty fee would be paid to the US 
authorities. The US admissions not only covered the deal with Saudi Arabia but also smaller 
deals with the Central European countries such as Czech Republic and also Tanzania which 
were conducted in an unethical way (Guardian, 2010b). 
Analysis of BAE Systems  
 
As mentioned, BAE nurtured a long relationship filled with corrupt payments and gifts with 
Saudi Arabia. The way this was gone about is not uncommon in the world of corporate 
corruption; the payments are done from anonymous or scam units. This is done for the 
obvious reasons of concealing payments and taking precautions against getting caught. This 
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could however be linked to the Bad Barrel perspective‟s ethical structural distance as well. 
Having a dispersed organizational structure with many entities around the world and 
delegating corrupt payments – would make it ethically easier to be corrupt than actually 
making the payment yourself. The existence of „Poseidon‟ served likely an additional purpose 
to just concealing payments; also clearing the conscious of many executives. 
Saudi Arabia has 4.7 in CPI, which is relatively high compared to the host countries of the 
other cases, however it is still lower than the United Kingdom‟s score of 7.6. Although not 
implemented effectively, the Saudi law does provide criminal penalties regarding corruption. 
For instance, government officials who accept bribes face ten years in prison or are fined with 
as much as $267,000.  Despite punishment, corruption is perceived to be a problem in Saudi 
Arabia especially regarding high positioned government officials and members of the royal 
family. The law relieves the government and royal family from providing public access of 
their revenues and assets – leaving the population in uncertainty. (GlobalSecurity,n.d)  
Oil money and beneficial laws, which allow corruption havens, make Saudi Arabia the perfect 
partner in crime. We do not believe corruption to be pervasive in Saudi Arabia, only 
opportunistic. The relation between BAE and Saudi Arabia has been on-going since the 80‟s 
leaving no reason other than profit to explain the actions of BAE Systems.  
5.6 Bridgestone Corporation  
According to Reuters (2008), the Japanese tyre producer Bridgestone Corp. admitted in 2008 
that their overseas subsidiaries had paid bribes to sell marine hoses, which are used to 
transport oil between tankers and shore. In December that same year the former general 
manager of the company‟s Engineered Products division Misao Hioki, was sentenced to two 
years in prison and fined to pay $80,000, charged under the FCPA. The reason for this coming 
to the US jurisdiction is that meetings on the topic of bribery had taken place in Bridgestone‟s 
offices in Houston, Texas. The allegations suggest that he had bribed via local sales agents in 
Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador, Mexico and Venezuela; in order to win business in state-owned 
companies. This discovery was made when the European Commission and the Japanese Fair 
Trade Commission co-conducted an investigation on the companies suspected to be involved 
in the international cartel on marine hoses. It uncovered that the price of marine hoses were 
rigged and inflated, resulting in the arrest of eight executives from the French arm of Swedish 
Trelleborg and British Dunlop Oil & Marine, and lastly Hioki. Bloomberg (2009) reveals that 
Bridgestone was fined with the highest price of €58.5 million because it was believed by the 
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European Commission that they helped lead the cartel. The company that received the second 
highest fine was Trelleborg, paying €24,5 million.  
Bridgestone executives apologized and made the statement that such corrupt act do indeed 
hurt the trust and betray the confidence that their customers, share holders and other business 
partners have in the company. Furthermore, they it Bridgestone would stop producing marine 
hoses and leave the market. Although Bridgestone had 30-40 per cent of the $140 million 
global market, marine hoses make up for a small share of total revenues. CEO Shoshi 
Arakawa said that the scandal would have a small impact on the company‟s immediate 
earning, but hurt the reputation and brand of Stonebridge Corp (Reuters, 2008).  
Analysis of Brigdestone Corporations  
 
The executive Misao Hioki was antagonized in the Bridgestone scandal, similar to the 
Siemens scandal. He was not only perceived as responsible for the scandal, he was the only 
one from Bridgestone who was penalized with a prison-sentence and a personal fine. This too, 
is consistent with the Bad Apple perspective. Not much can be said about the ethical 
disposition of Hioki, since we do not have any statements from him. However, seen from the 
Bad Barrel perspective, more motives to the corrupt behaviour can be provided.  
In this case, the environment exceeds Bridgestone and its subsidiaries. The international cartel 
consisting of many companies of different origins, could have all created an environment 
encouraging inflating prices and bribing foreign officials. For a cartel to work it needs to be 
participated by and supported of all members, otherwise the cartel crumbles and price-based 
competition resumes.  This could have created an environment where the companies relied on 
each other and consequently pressured each other to further co-operation. Winning business 
deals was undoubtedly the initiative motive behind leading the cartel, however pressures from 
participating companies could have encouraged corruption to a higher scale or elongated co-
operation.   
This is in fact out of character for Japan to be engaged in bribery when doing business 
abroad.. According to the BPI, Japan is one of the countries least likely to bribe foreign 
officials. However, this view was not shared by Latin America in the index. Bridgestone made 
illegal payments to only Latin- and Central American countries, all which have a CPI under 
four, lower than Japan‟s score of 7.9. In Mexico and Argentina (Ecuador and Venezuela were 
not included in the BPI) the institutions that were considered to be most corrupt by executives 
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were; political parties, the police and the juridical institutions, but also customs in Argentina. 
These institutions could have indeed caused delays and other problems for the companies 
involved in the Bridgestone scandal; however putting this in relation to all the crimes 
committed by the companies, satisfying petty custom officials seems to fade in comparison to 
the profit-maximizing motives.  
 
5.7 Panalpina and Royal Dutch Shell  
 
Bloomberg Businessweek (2010) state the following; in 2010, during the Bonga Deepwater 
Project, the Dutch oil giant Shell admitted to paying bribes in Nigeria worth $2 million. When 
the Nigerian subcontractors were paid, the company knew that some of the payments would to 
go public officials and allowed this to happen in the purpose of evading customs and other 
processes; giving Shell an illegal advantage to their competitors. According to SEC, Shell 
profited $14 million from the payments in the Bonga Deepwater Project. Shell was sentenced 
to pay a penalty fee of $48.1 million to settle SEC probes; however not the company to be 
penalized by SEC. The Swiss freight and logistics company Panalpina, hired by Shell, paid in 
fines $82 million after admitting to have paid bribes on the behalf of their clients. According 
to the company, they were involved in arrangements and Shell‟s Nigerian employees had 
specifically requested them to provide false invoices to cover corrupt payments and dodge 
suspicion. Panalpina was convicted for bribing custom officials in several countries, including 
Russia, Angola and Turkmenistan. The bribes in Nigeria took different forms, sometimes they 
were paid sporadically and sometimes they were systemic, as in monthly allowances - 
ensuring that officials would treat Panalpina and its clients favourably.  
Both Panalpina and Shell have acknowledged and accept the responsibility that follows the 
wrong doings and most executives were replaced after the scandal. Moreover, Shell 
spokeswoman Kristen Smart says in a statement that Shell has since the scandal tightened its 
internal controls and enhanced its compliance program (The Telegraph, 2010).  
Analysis of Panalpina and Royal Dutch Shell  
 
Panalpina, keen on keeping clients content, was involved in a bribery scandal which took 
place in most corrupted countries in the world; Russia, Angola and Turkmenistan with CPI‟s 
of 2.1, 1.9 respective 1.6. Shell in this case, gave directives to Panalpina to make illegal 
payments and they obeyed. This behaviour can be justified if seen from the Bad Barrel 
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perspective. Social psychological experiments show that when given an order to engage in an 
unethical act, it is likely to give in to the order even if it contradicts to one self‟s ethical 
disposition. Panalpina is perhaps a “decent” company, who has only fallen into the ways of 
corruption because of clients. Conforming to the ethics of Shell would give the incentives of 
keeping a lucrative client such as Shell. However correct the Bad Barrel perspective may be, 
companies and executives are prosecuted as liberal individuals, responsible for their own 
actions.  
Russia was not only the country most likely to be engaged in corruption abroad, but it was 
also the highest country in the BPI, to be perceived as corrupt. Circa half of the interviewees 
experienced corruption in Russia in forms of “bribery to high-ranking politicians or political 
parties, low-level public officials to "speed things up and use of personal and familiar 
relationships on public contracting”. 74 per cent of the Russian population perceived the 
levels of corruption as “high” or “very high” (Transparency International, 2009a) 
Angola is also highly corrupt, not surprisingly given the country‟s long history of conflict and 
drug trade. The situation post-conflict, is characterized by a monopolized elite in power, in 
control of the natural resources such as oil and diamonds (Transparency International, 2009a). 
The corruption in all the above-mentioned countries is undoubtedly pervasiveness. The 
corruption levels are amazingly high, especially in Angola and Turkmenistan, so much so that 
doing business in a clean matter is not probable.  
5.8 IBM  
 
According to the Wall Street Journal (2011) The International Business Machine Corp. 
recently came under accusations of a decade-long bribery scandal through their subsidiaries in 
Asia. An investigation by FCPA enforcers concluded that more than 100 employees of the 
computer giant had engaged in bribery between 1998 and 2009. The alleged goal was to 
secure contracts for their hardware products. 
More specifically, the charges concerned a joint venture in South Korea, where employees 
had been seen literally handing over bags of cash, and opening credit tabs for government 
officials in bars and restaurants in hopes of being allowed to deliver mainframe computers to 
the government. Suspicion arose when in September of 2000, IBM delivered computers for a 
value well over $1,3 million to the same government, that were later found to be faulty. Even 
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so, IBM continued to land contracts with the South Korean state after a certain official 
received a deposit of some $14,000. 
Furthermore, in China, IBM was instead accused of elaborate gift giving, rather than 
traditional bribes. Between 2004 and 2009, they were found to have created slush funds at 
travel agencies in order to provide vacations for Chinese government officials (Wall Street 
Journal, 2011). 
These charges, coupled with those in South Korea, led the US Dept. of Justice to pursue civil 
charges against the company, which agreed to $10 million in disgorged profits and fines. This 
penalty is rather mild for FCPA standards, but the bribes themselves were also relatively 
small in size. IBM managers have stated that they have very clear ethical standards that apply 
to all employees, but that it is difficult for them to micro-manage the rather autonomous 
business units in Asia and other far corners of the globe. Indeed, IBM is a titanic company 
that made upwards $100 billion dollars of revenue during 2010. More than a fifth of this was 
generated in the emerging markets of eastern Asia, hinting at the growing significance of the 
region in the industry. Since the investigation ended, U.S. authorities have continued to 
pursue the tech industry heavily in FCPA cases, looking in to the overseas operations of 
Hewlett-Packard among others (Wall Street Journal, 2011). 
 
Analysis of IBM  
 
One interesting thing that comes across in this case is that when allegations were made against 
IBM, the company HQ neither denied nor admitted to any of the charges made against them. 
Instead, they simply accepted the fact that bribery had been committed and paid the fines, 
after taking “necessary remedial action”. HQ also commented on the difficulty of controlling 
autonomous management abroad. This all suggests that indeed, the corrupted actions were 
carried out by the local managers, without the knowledge and consent of the top management. 
If this is so, then it is truly an example of where implementation of ethical standards has not 
succeeded. 
Another noteworthy aspect of this case is that many of the bribed were in the form perhaps 
more aptly referred to as gifts. In the region of eastern Asia, this is a much more accepted part 
of doing business (Lovett, Simmons and Kali, 1999). 
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The question of local adaptation versus global integration is a constant one in the international 
business subject. When a culture differs much from the domestic one, adaptation is necessary 
in order to achieve economies of scope. Even so, it seems that adapting to a culture also 
means potentially adapting to its negative aspects, such as its tolerance for bribes. Another 
hazard could be hiring local personnel, whose domestic culture leaves them with higher 
acceptance for gift-giving (or bribes) in business. It seems that the law suit could have been 
avoided had communication of company standards and American law been clearer or better 
implemented. This would however mean that IBM‟s business relations in China and South 
Korea could suffer. Still, as a company that states their intention to always conduct business 
ethically, that ought to be the preferred choice regardless.  
5.9 A Cross-case analysis  
 
When comparing the cases analyses, we can see that corruption is widespread across the 
global marketplace. No country is completely spared, but looking at the cases, many 
similarities are noticeable, creating a behavioural pattern amongst the MNCs. Firstly, the 
countries where the MNC‟s are headquartered experience much lower corruption levels than 
the host countries. Using CPI as a tool for this observation, one will see that the countries 
where the MNC‟s originate from have a CPI index of at least 6.8 - ten being the cleanest. 
Holland is the cleanest country with a CPI of 8.8 and the US is the country with the lowest 
CPI score, scoring 7.1 – still much higher than all the host-countries in every case. 
Another conclusion that can be drawn when overlooking all of the mini-cases is that 
persecution never occurs in the country where the crimes are perpetrated. Ultimately, legal 
action is taken in the host country of the MNC or in some other more developed country 
where the country has operations. Perhaps this explains why legislation such as the FCPA has 
such a broad and vague jurisdiction; if legal persecution never occurs in the host country them 
many companies would go unpunished.  
The most apparent theme that the cases show is that corruption is indeed as widespread as it is 
varied. Reading through them, no continent goes unmentioned as affected by corruption and 
its devastating socio-economic effects. As the process of globalization shortens the distance 
between the regions of the globe, it is perhaps no surprise that this has become a very 
international issue. We therefore conclude that collaboration is essential to prevent further 
corruption.  For the time being, the developed countries are typically the ones that persecute 
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corruption related crime. They do not however suffer nearly as much from its long-term 
consequences. There is an apparent necessity for host nations to engage more deeply in 
dealing with the issue pro-actively. 
This brief analysis serves the purpose of highlighting some general noticeable patterns that all 
the cases share. It does however not attempt to answer the research questions, as this is done 
exclusively in the conclusions part of the thesis. 
6. Conclusion  
 
On the basis of our cases, we can conclude that the first driving force to corruption aboard is 
profit maximizing. As we saw with Johnson & Johnson and BAE Systems, the countries they 
were doing business with, were not dealing with corruption on a pervasive level and we can 
therefore state that bribery was not committed due to local adaptation. A motive behind 
making illegal payments is always to make lucrative business deals to some extent, bearing in 
mind that other motives may dominate decisions of bribing foreign officials and businesses as 
well. Fear is an additional motive that triggers corrupt behaviour: as seen in the Panalpina and 
Siemens cases. Panalpina followed the orders of engaging in corrupt behaviour in the hope of 
keeping their large client Shell. Former Siemens executive Sieczeck stated that fear of losing 
his business unit and employees losing their jobs, made him commit the crimes he was 
penalized for.   
 
However, sometimes the environment can create an impossible situation where managers 
have to choose between bribing and doing business, or not doing business at all. This is highly 
possible in countries such as Turkmenistan, Iraq, and Angola – countries that Panalpina has 
conducted business in and greatly suffer from pervasive corruption.  The environment can 
also impose corrupt behaviour due to culture differences. An example of this was given in the 
IBM case, where gift exchanging was a norm in China but condemned by the Transparency 
International. If one tries to categorize the behaviour of these managers based on the four 
Straw Men theories of ethical behaviour, we can see that a company usually pays bribes in 
countries where it is more likely to succeed and is more culturally acceptable. This does not 
however mean that they do not consciously break the law, which means that both the 
Friedman Doctrine and Righteous Moralism describe them poorly. It would rather seem that 
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Cultural Relativism describes the mentality behind this behaviour. This also supports the idea 
of corruption via local cultural adaptation. 
 
In addition, a particular factor gives way for corporate corruption; it regards ethical distance 
and how companies delegate illegal payments, either to third party agents, shell companies or 
remote subsidiaries - to secure the secrecy of their actions and clear their conscious.  
7. Recommendations 
 
Our recommendation for companies that want to avoid engaging in unethical behavior abroad 
is firstly to very carefully evaluate their prospect markets from the perspective of transparency 
before entering. If a multination decides to launch a venture in Nigeria, they should be very 
well aware of to what degree and in with what institutions they are likely to encounter 
corruption. They should then prepare accordingly. Ethical standards and extremely clear 
codes of conduct need to me communicated to the concerned employees so that they are never 
left with making a personal decision regarding a questionable situation. That decision should 
already be made for them, and be in line with international law. The tools for how to evaluate 
markets and how to act are readily available as several organizations the international 
community works constantly with fighting corruption. 
One approach to strategically dealing with corruption when internationalizing is to think of 
ethical principles as an advantage on competition rather than a burden. If used in the CSR 
policy of a company, ethical principles regarding corruption can be used to build a positive 
image. In this way, powerful MNCs can instead use their influence to be a positive example 
rather than feeding the Naïve Immoralists of the world with incentives to act unethically. 
According to Kwok and Tadesse (2006), the MNC has profound effects on the institutional 
environment of less developed host countries. It would be counterproductive if this transfer 
were to further entrench less developed nations in corruption rather than showing the way to a 
working, ethical private sector. 
Corruption is not always as obvious as a bad of cash handed over in a dark alleyway. In some 
cultures, casual gift-giving is a natural part of business life. Even so, it can result in legal 
prosecution in another country. It is therefore important to be well aware of the boundaries of 
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the potentially relevant legislation. This legislation can also change. It is for example no 
longer legal to make facilitating payments under the OECD convention on corruption. 
We also recommend that companies be especially careful when allowing local adaptation of 
business in countries that are known to have ethical standards other than their own. As we 
have seen, a company will be prosecuted in their domestic country no matter the principles of 
the host nation. Once again, a clear communication of conduct needs to exist so that cultural 
adaptation does not lead to the corruption of employees. 
As we have seen, countries outside of the OECD are welcome to sign their convention and 
gain assistance in forming effective legislation and implementations. This convention was 
created because corruption should be beneficial for no one. It is necessary that the playing is 
leveled so that fair competition can exercise its healthy effects on the global market.  
The U.N., the OECD, Transparency International as well as many other organizations work 
constantly with providing frameworks for not only conduct but also legislation and 
implementation of principles for governments. We therefore urge anyone on either side of a 
corrupt relationship to seek assistance and never act when uncertain. 
Ultimately, it is obvious that managers sometimes know full well that they are acting 
unethically, even illegally, and still choose to do so without pressure from the environment. In 
the cases where the goal is to simply make profit out of illegal behavior, we can offer little 
advice, as these are criminal acts that deserve prosecution. We can only hope that the 
continued efforts to root out this behavior will result in managers and government officials 
everywhere realizing that, in the long-term, corruption is a game without winners. 
8. Further research  
As the main research question would suggest, the aim for this thesis was to identify the 
various reasons to corporate corruption when internationalizing. The behavioral patterns 
which were found in the chosen cases, were used to draw the conclusion in this thesis. 
However, less attention was given to the second research question regarding solutions to 
corporate corruption. Further research could be an elaboration of this aspect. Future research 
questions might concern effective anti-corruption business strategies or perhaps how to best 
incorporate anti-corruption policies into a MNCs CSR program.  
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Figure 2 (Transparency International ,2010b)  
 
 
Figure 3 (Transparency International, 2008)   
